

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JAKART 02455 01 OF 02 240901Z
ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-05 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01 USIA-06 EB-08 /065 W
-----013526 240925Z /21

R 240815Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7017
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
CINCPAC
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 JAKARTA 2455

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, ECIN, ID, TH
SUBJECT: THAI PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

REF: (A) JAKARTA 2295 (NOTAL), (B) JAKARTA 2386, (C) JAKARTA 2390
(NOTAL)

1. ON FEBRUARY 24, DCM CALLED ON HIS OPPOSITE THAI COLLEAGUE
AND OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE RECENT VISIT TO
INDONESIA OF THE THAI PRIME MINISTER.

2. SUBSTANTIVELY, THE VISIT WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE PARTS.
THE FIRST CONSISTED OF THE PRIVATE TALK BETWEEN PRESIDENT
SUHARTO AND PRIME MINISTER KRIANGSAK. THE SECOND COVERED
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. THE THIRD COVERED POLITICAL AND SOME
MILITARY MATTERS. INDONESIANS HAD WISHED AN ENTIRE PART
OF THE TALKS DEVOTED PURELY TO SECURITY MATTERS BUT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 02455 01 OF 02 240901Z

THAIS INFORMED GOI THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED DISCUSS
SECURITY MATTERS SINCE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT WAS MAINLY
A "GET ACQUAINTED" ONE TO INDONESIA AND OTHER ASEAN
STATES. THEREFORE SECURITY MATTERS TOUCHED UPON WERE
INCLUDED IN POLITICAL TALKS WHERE SUCH INDONESIAN OFFI-
CIALS AS GENERAL YOGA, GENERAL MURDANI AND HANKAM REPRE-
SENTATIVES WERE PRESENT.

3. THE ECONOMIC TALKS COVERED THE PURCHASE OF RICE BY INDONESIA, THE SALE OF OIL BY INDONESIA TO THAILAND, CIVIL AVIATION AND POSSIBLE AIRCRAFT SALES TO THAILAND BY INDONESIA.

A. REGARDING RICE AGREEMENTS, NO FINAL DECISION WAS REACHED BUT THAILAND AGREED TO SUPPLY AS MUCH RICE AS POSSIBLE, DEPENDING UPON THAI RICE SURPLUS, AT MARKET PRICE MINUS AN "ASEAN" DISCOUNT.

B. ON THE SUBJECT OF OIL, WHILE INDONESIA IS AGREE-ABLE TO PROVIDING THAILAND WITH SAME, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT NO OIL OF THE QUALITY NEEDED BY THAI REFINERIES IS AVAILABLE. THEREFORE A FURTHER STUDY WILL HAVE TO BE MADE AND AGREEMENT REACHED AT A FUTURE BANGKOK MEETING.

C. ON CIVIL AVIATION, NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD REGARDING THE INTRODUCTION OF A SEVENTH WEEKLY FLIGHT BY THAI AIRWAYS AND ALSO THE SUBSTITUTION BY THIS AIRLINE OF THEIR NEW AIRBUS 300 FOR THE PRESENT DC-8S. THE PROBLEM HERE LIES IN THE FACT THAT GARUDA IS TRYING TO MONOPOLIZE THE ROUTES TO BALI AND THE SINGAPORE-JAKARTA CORRIDOR, DESPITE THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN SUHARTO AND THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THAI AIRWAYS SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE RIGHTS ON BOTH.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JAKART 02455 01 OF 02 240901Z

D. NO FIRM AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED ON THE PURCHASE OF HELICOPTERS AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT BEING MANUFACTURED IN BANDUNG BUT THE VARIOUS THAI ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL MINISTERS VISITED BANDUNG AT THE END OF THE TALKS TO INSPECT THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING FACILITIES.

4. THE POLITICAL TALKS COVERED THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA, RELATIONS WITH THE SUPER POWERS, RELATIONS WITH INDOCHINA, ASEAN, THE INTERNAL THAI SITUATION AND OTHER ISSUES INCLUDING DELIMITATION OF THE ANDAMAN SEA BOUNDARIES.

A. THE INDONESIANS ASSURED THE THAI THAT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IS UNDER CONTROL AND THAT STABILITY WOULD BE MAINTAINED THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. IN RESPONSE TO A THAI QUERY, THE GOI SIDE STATES THAT THE STUDENTS WERE SUPPORTED AND ENCOURAGED BY CERTAIN INDONESIAN POLITICAL FIGURES WHO WERE KNOWN AND WHO WERE UNDER OBSERVATION. THEY DECLARED THAT NO RPT NO FOREIGN SUPPORT IS RECEIVED BY THE STUDENTS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JAKART 02455 02 OF 02 240909Z
ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-05 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01 USIA-06 EB-08 /065 W
-----013581 240922Z /21

R 240815Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7018
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
CINCPAC
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 JAKARTA 2455

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

B. IN DISCUSSION OF RELATIONS WITH SUPER POWERS,
INDONESIAN OFFICIALS STATED THAT THOSE WITH THE US WERE
EXCELLENT, THOSE WITH THE SOVIET UNION CORRECT AND THOSE
WITH THE PRC DEPENDED ON THE LATTER'S ATTITUDE. WITH
RESPECT TO THE LATTER, MOCHTAR STATED THAT RELATIONS
WERE UP TO THE PRC. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE DECLARED
THAT THERE WERE TWO FACTS WHICH WORRIED INDONESIA. THE
FIRST WAS THE CONTINUED DUAL POLICY OF THE CHINESE
WHEREBY THEY DEAL WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES ON A STATE-TO-
STATE BASIS, AS WELL AS ON A PARTY-TO-PARTY BASIS. THE
SECOND DISTURBING FACTOR IS THE RECENT CHINESE DECLARA-
TION REGARDING OVERSEAS CHINESE. IN THIS THE GOI SEES
A CONTRADICTION TO THE PREVIOUS PRC ATTITUDE ANNOUNCED
AT THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND LATER REPEATED BY CHOU
EN LAI TO SUKARNO WHEREBY OVERSEAS CHINESE WERE URGED
TO BECOME ASSIMILATED IN AND CITIZENS OF THE COUNTRY
IN WHICH THEY RESIDE. (COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO PUT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 02455 02 OF 02 240909Z

SOME DOUBT ON THE EARLY NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WHICH MOST OF THE OBSERVERS HAVE EXPECTED WOULD TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.)

C. CONCERNING INDOCHINA, THE THAIS PASSED THE MESSAGE FROM IENG SARY EXPRESSING CAMBODIAN DESIRE FOR RELATIONS (REFTEL A). BOTH GOI AND RTG WELCOME THIS INDICATION THAT CAMBODIA PREPARED WIDEN ITS RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. THE INDONESIANS WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THAI ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAMBODIA, AS WELL AS THE REST OF INDOCHINA, AND ASKED WHETHER THE RTG WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE PRC ROLE IN CAMBODIAN AFFAIRS AND THE TAI INSURGENCY. IN RESPONSE, THE THAIS REPLIED THAT DUE TO THEIR SITUATION IN THE "FRONT LINES" THEY FELT THEY MUST HAVE RELATIONS WITH ALL THEIR NEIGHBORS NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS. WITH RESPECT TO THE THAI INSURGENCY, THEY ARE DETERMINED TO MASTER IT WITHOUT REGARD TO WHO MAY BE SUPPORTING IT. IN THIS CONNECTION AND THAT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SUPER POWERS, THE THAI DELEGATION POINTED OUT THE DIFFERENCE OBSERVED IN PRC AND SOVIET TACTICS TOWARDS FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: WHEREAS THE CHINESE ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE OR SUBVERT INDIRECTLY THROUGH POLITICAL PARTIES, THE SOVIET UNION ACTS DIRECTLY THROUGH THE PARTY IN POWER. THE THAIS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THEY INTENDED TO INCREASE TRADE WITH CAMBODIA AS A MEANS OF INFLUENCING THAT COUNTRY AND, IN RESPONSE TO AN INDONESIAN QUERY, STATED THAT THE "DOMINO THEORY" NO LONGER WAS VALID, AS DEMONSTRATED DURING THREE YEARS SINCE THE FALL OF VIETNAM.

D. ASEAN WAS ONLY TOUCHED ON DURING TALKS AND NO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JAKART 02455 02 OF 02 240909Z

PROBLEMS WERE RAISED.

E. IN REPLY TO DCM'S QUESTION, THAI DCM STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF US-ASEAN DIALOGUES OR OF NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES.

5. IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE ANDAMAN SEA BOUNDARIES, THAI DCM DECLARED THAT, ON A VERY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, HE WISHED TO STATE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE AGREEMENT WERE IMPORTANT MORE FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW THAN FROM A PURELY TECHNICAL ONE OF DELINEATION OF BOUNDARIES. THE THAIS ARE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO SET A PRECEDENT IN CASE IN THE FUTURE THE PRC SHOULD TRY TO EXTEND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS OR CONTINENTAL SHELF INTO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ON THE BASIS THAT THE

AREA HAS ALWAYS BEEN CALLED BY THAT NAME AND THEREFORE SHOULD BELONG TO CHINA.

6. COMMENT: AS NOTED IN EARLIER EMBASSY REPORTS ON THE VISIT, IT SEEMS TO HAVE GONE OFF VERY WELL, REGARDING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS, THESE TWO MEN SEEM TO HAVE HIT IT OFF VERY WELL. MOCHTAR, IN CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR, HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR UPADIT WHO HE SAID HAD GIVEN HIM GOOD POINTERS ON A FOREIGN MINISTER'S TASKS. (HE ALSO SPOKE COMPLIMENTARILY OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PARTY EXCEPT FOR ONE UNNAMED MINISTER, WHO HE SAID WAS NOT HELPFUL.) IN THE SAME VEIN, THAI DCM STATED THAT THE THAI DELEGATION HAD FOUND MOCHTAR ABLE AND ENERGETIC. MASTERS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRIME MINISTER, VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978JAKART02455
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780085-1073
Format: TEL
From: JAKARTA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780218/aaaaaomo.tel
Line Count: 239
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: c5d238d0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 JAKARTA 2295, 78 JAKARTA 2386, 78 JAKARTA 2390
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3490389
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THAI PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO INDONESIA
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, ECIN, OVIP, ID, TH
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/c5d238d0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014